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Abstract
This interview with Ulrich Beck was undertaken in late August 2014. At this juncture
Beck was preparing what was to be his final book, The Metamorphosis of the World
(2016). The conversation is reflective of Beck’s thinking around the theory of meta-
morphosis at that time and represents his views on the underlying dynamics of social
transformation and the mobilizing power of global risks.
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GM: Following on from our previous exchanges about the constitution
of metamorphosis, I was trying to ﬁnd a metaphor to describe
the moment that you have identiﬁed between people recognizing that
metamorphosis is a socially occurring phenomenon and the broader
underlying sets of dynamics that characterize it as a distinct process.
The metaphor that I was cogitating on was the double helix, which is a
concept derived from the natural sciences. Essentially the double helix is
conﬁgured by a pair of parallel strands running around a common axis.
I just wondered if this functions as a metaphor in relation to your con-
ception of metamorphosis? As I understand it, the double helix contains
two linear strands that run in opposite directions, but interlace. So I
wonder if metamorphosis constitutes that moment at which the two
strands connect together. The point at which recognition and practice
align and are seen to do so. Maybe the possibility of metamorphosis is
the articulation that may arise in the moment at which the person who is
inured to using the old techniques, methods, ways of seeing and so forth
and has been traveling in one direction comes together and confronts the
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processes that are quite dramatic and have been running in the other
direction.
UB: Oh, yes.
GM: Maybe the double helix can help explain that intersection point
between the moments at which the researchers themselves become meta-
morphosed as they recognize transformations in underlying societal
dynamics. As a consequence of this coming together they begin to rec-
ognize both the new world which is rolling out in front of their eyes and
also the change within themselves. Does this align with the transform-
ations that you are describing in the theory of metamorphosis?
UB: Yes. Those are really interesting observations. I myself have thought
about utilizing metaphors to convey what is unique about metamor-
phosis. Mine are a little bit diﬀerent from your metaphor. What I like
about your idea is that, in actual fact, not only the researchers and tech-
nicians, but all of us – maybe most of society as well – is looking in one
direction. And this direction is actually how we deﬁne the normal process
of modernization, concentrating or focusing on the production and dis-
tribution of goods. In this way, lots of people create what are considered
to be innovations that many people conceptualize and understand as
progress. But such a perspective minimizes the issue of side eﬀects. It is
a common way of looking at modernity. Indeed, because of this and
because modernization is successful, the process begins to travel in the
opposite direction. Modernization is producing bads, all kind of bads.
This is verwandlung (metamorphosis) in action. It is not actually the
crisis, but rather the success story of modernization. The prime examples
of this are nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, but there are many
others as well. This is a conventional argument. The double helix meta-
phor allows for a diﬀerent way of thinking. I really like this. But we don’t
currently recognize this way of thinking in the ways in which we conceive
of progress and innovation. We have this dialectical relationship,
whereby the process of travel in one direction is increasing. If we
ignore it, matters gets even worse, but then something else happens.
You can see this occurring in the public sphere to some extent. Public
debates would be one example where you can discern this process, but
you can also see it within science as well, where the focus of discussion
has been changed by the observer or by the actor. We can talk about this
and we can identify the change of focus which is now on bads, not goods.
The distribution and production of bads introduces huge social conﬂicts.
All kinds of debates come up and new forms of public movements
emerge. Suddenly then people start to take notice of the transformations
that are ongoing in the other direction. This is a discernible fact.
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Then comes the next step in the relationship between goods and bads
as I see it. Bads look like a threat. But this is only part of the story. In the
next step of metamorphosis, one concentrates on bads and appreciates
that they really are endangering humanity. Following on from this you
can also see that there is a subsequent process going on: bads are produ-
cing common goods. At least to some extent and in a very speciﬁc way, in
terms of normative expectations and normative imperatives. Again, this
produces conﬂicts because of the tensions that arise in the course of
changing normative horizons. So, you have to make a clear distinction
between normative horizons and the institutional implementation of
social reforms and policy changes. Actually, you could argue that dia-
logue in the social sciences about metamorphosis is taking place in a
stadium of incomplete metamorphosis. Because there is no doubt that
debates about the nature of social change are opening up, but what is
going to be the next step? The direction of travel is not as yet determined.
You could work through a series of diﬀerent examples that might allow
you to deﬁne the contours of these debates, but I do think that it is quite
appealing to think about metamorphosis as a process which involves
travel in two directions.
GM: Yes, the thing that intrigued me with the double helix metaphor is
that the two directions of travel may at ﬁrst appear unconnected. So, to
employ the metaphor in relation to your project, you could argue that
along one strand we have a series of processes that are materializing –
propelled by risk, individualization, and cosmopolitization – which are,
by and large, not being institutionally acknowledged. What’s happening
here is that both the institutional – and arguably the individual – ways of
seeing do not enable us to grasp the dynamics of the processes that are
shaping the world. Now, with metamorphosis, as with the double helix,
what emerges is a crossing point between those two things, an articula-
tion, if you will.
UB: Yes. Precisely.
GM: Following the molecular structure of the double helix, this consti-
tutes a ﬁgure of eight, perhaps? So I suppose that my view – why the
metaphor might be useful – is that I think that you are arguing that this
linkage is a necessary stage. It is not just a coming together, but rather an
intersection point at which people come to properly understand and
appreciate the nature and the extent of change.
UB: That’s a very good idea. This is precisely what I have in mind. If we
can grasp and realize this, then there are new possibilities for action.
Maybe sometimes these are very simple ones – which we haven’t recog-
nized so far – and sometimes they are more complicated. One important
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challenge is to unravel this combination, to understand the power of this
connection. If we focus on the potential of this synthesis, we can see that
quite a few things are happening. First, we can identify that a metamor-
phosis is in train from a national to a cosmopolitan perspective. The
second element is that, actually, the blinkeredness of the national per-
spective remains a threat, precisely because national institutions are at
risk. But from a cosmopolitan or global perspective, something positive
is actually happening. New normative horizons emerge which bring new
social and political imperatives. The idea that we are in a post-modern
world where everything is uncertain is quite wrong. On the contrary, we
have very deﬁnite ideas about how the world has to be changed in order
for us to survive.
One of the problems which I still don’t quite understand – but which I
am trying to work through myself – is the way in which problems and
issues that seem so complicated to manage at the national level – to such
an extent that nothing actually works anymore – can become quite
simple to deal with when broached at the global level. One example of
this is if you want to institutionalize a norm on the national level. This is
very complicated. Especially a norm which has critical implications for
institutions. But creating a normative consensus on the global level is a
process that is already happening directly as a consequence of public
debates and discussions about the impacts of risks and catastrophes on
humanity. This is routinely occurring even though it is not written down
or institutionalized in a speciﬁc form. At the global level – even if disbe-
lievers refute it – some fundamental things are happening from one
moment to the next and these arise out of anticipating and reﬂecting
on catastrophes.
I came up with another metaphor this morning to describe this situ-
ation when discussing it with Elizabeth, my wife. We discussed the meta-
phor of a survivor of a shipwreck waking up on a desert island. In this
situation the survivor meets people on the island and is confronted by
another world. The shipwrecked person has a huge problem, because
everything seems to be so diﬀerent and they don’t understand the
people that live on the island. Everything is diﬀerent: language and pre-
vious knowledge don’t help at all in this unfamiliar context. They have
no idea what to say or do. Then, as time passes, the survivor ﬁnds a
language book and begins to learn the grammar of the island. They read
with great hunger and begin to understand the environment and the
people that live in it.
So, our metaphor is that we are actually shipwrecked in the world risk
society. We have been catapulted into a diﬀerent world of bads and we
don’t understand what’s going on at all. All the ﬁxed certainties and
points of orientation have disappeared and we are getting desperate
because we don’t know where we are or how to move on. In this uncer-
tain age, some people will undoubtedly say: ‘okay, we just need to carry
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on with progress as normal and everything will disappear’. But this isn’t
very convincing or reassuring. It doesn’t make any sense. So, what I am
trying to do with metamorphosis is to construct a book of grammar in
order to ﬁnd a language to render this world – the global risk society –
understandable. Using the theoretical prism of metamorphosis I’m pick-
ing up on all kinds of topics like international politics, class and world
cities and trying to understand them in the context of the processes I’ve
talked about previously, which are global risk, cosmopolitization and
individualization. This is the experimental space which I have tried to
develop in order to engage with what might arise in the future and how
we can make sense of it and research it in the present.
GM: I wanted to ask you about institutional change and the extent to
which you think institutions have modernized in a reﬂexive manner. I’m
thinking primarily about your concept of ‘organized irresponsibility’,
which I thought was a fantastic term and just captured a set of practices
that had previously been diﬃcult to pin down. I was wondering whether
you feel that Western institutions have become more reﬂexive and
whether they have learnt to cope with uncertainty and manage risk in
more sophisticated and progressive ways or whether you think that they
are still tied to the old ways of thinking and acting.
UB: I think reﬂexivity in the sense of reﬂection is an important ingredi-
ent, but it wouldn’t tell the whole story – at least this is my point of view
now. Maybe we can see it as a door that we need to open to get into other
debates. For instance, those about what I am calling the ‘digital risk’. As
I see it, this is a risk that is, in some ways, intangible – you cannot feel it,
you cannot smell it, you cannot get physically hurt by it. Instead, it is
related to sets of values, such as freedom. This gives it a diﬀerent quality
and power. If you want to look at what happens in digital modernity
through the glasses of the normal modernization process, you can see
that issues of freedom involve institutional actors, norms, laws in order
to enforce standards which, in the best case, might be considered as
appropriate, but which fail, totally fail. This paradox is what I call the
failing of functional institutions.
For example, in Germany we had this big public debate and looked at
our civil rights and freedoms and how they should be protected. So, we
now have a legal policy which is ostensibly operational – let’s imagine this
is the case for amoment – but the system of law does not really relate to the
new space of possibilities which is opened by global surveillance systems.
So institutions are, to some extent, losing their functionality and, for them,
the best way to not make this visible – part of the institutional reaction to
the situation anyway – is to resort to the politics of invisibility. Most of the
risks which I would say are naturally invisible – and by natural invisibility
I don’t just mean to the senses, not only the senses – I mean that this
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invisibility is underpinned by very complex sets of issues. It is this very
complexity which makes the issues invisible. And therefore in order to
make those global risks visible, institutions have to do something.
Radiation is one of those examples. You really have to do something. If
you don’t do anything you are just letting invisibility become the normal
state of law and politics. Here the actual failure of institutions can be again
changed into functionality – there is some functionality in the dysfunc-
tionality. Because if nobody talks about it, you know, if we keep it invis-
ible, then who is supposed to do something about it and how can we act? I
think that this is pretty much the case and we could identify a similar
process in relation to nuclear risks.
Let’s look at institutions from a historical point of view and assume
that they did previously have purpose and power. In failing to deal with
or manage transformations and upheavals they have lost this historical
purpose, both in terms of the issues that they were addressing and the
resources of power required to defend their own existence. I think there-
fore institutions are deﬁnitely failing, but it’s so diﬃcult to see this, since
to the naked eye institutions are there, they persist and endure. Thus, the
problem is that institutions are failing but surviving in the modern world.
They thus become an obstacle that prevents the political process of meta-
morphosis from happening.
GM: So would you say that institutions have become more reﬂective in
terms of awareness of social problems and in terms of being more critical
and future looking, but haven’t become reﬂexive?
UB: Well, I would say that they have become reﬂexive, but in a way
which enables them to continue with business as usual and not to
change in structure and focus. This describes the situation at present, I
think. Taking climate change as an example though, we can identify an
important exception. This global environmental risk opens up space for a
new kind and type of institution that has promising dynamics. With
climate change the diagnosis of the experts is not comparable with the
cases of radiation and nuclear power. It is not undermining their own
position, but exactly the opposite. The more they enforce the climate
change issue, the better standing they have and the more legitimacy
they gain. This produces a new model of organizing public science and
nation-states, that functions in a quasi-democratic way. It requires a
synthesis of democratic and scientiﬁc modes of organization that occur
on an international scale. So this type of combination is maybe a future
model for the new metaphor you mentioned, the double helix. Yes, this
would deﬁnitely be a good model for the double helix.
GM: Going back to your point about institutions failing but persisting,
this brings to my mind the problem of counter-terrorism strategy. Here,
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it’s the same issue of the state producing an institutional performance of
regulation rather than doing something that is actually likely to tackle
the root causes of political violence.
UB: It’s exactly the same problem. I wrote a little bit about this in the last
chapter of Cosmopolitan Vision. They are creating wars on top of wars
and this is making things worse.
GM: I just caught a little bit of the news late last night. Barack Obama
was talking about Iraq and ISIS. It was actually quite relevant in relation
to the point that you are making. He basically said here we have the
United States military. We have the strongest military in the world.
We can go into Iraq and we can wipe ISIS out. But only in that particular
instant. The moment that troops are withdrawn, the problem continues.
And that, for me, was quite refreshing to hear. That’s exactly the likely
outcome that wasn’t properly considered in the original decision to
invade Iraq.
UB: Indeed. This is one of the important points that comes up now in the
Arab world. We are trying to use the old means, the old military means
or whatever we have in order to try and ﬁx this situation. But the
moment we withdraw, everything is as it has been before. So, actually
this is a perfect demonstration of institutions failing. Institutions fail and
they don’t have any answers because they cannot keep up with the pace
of change. Historically speaking there have always been institutions that
have had diﬃculty in coping – and this is actually linked to social change
– but it’s not the same situation that we are in now. Because there is a
whole world of diﬀerence between the magnitude of problems we are
confronted with at present and the institutional resources, discourses
and concepts we have to understand and manage them.
In essence we are shipwrecked in our own world. But we are not sud-
denly shipwrecked. It’s not a dramatic occurrence. This is what makes it
so diﬃcult. The old structures and old institutions remain, but at the
same time they are all zombies that don’t work anymore for the problems
and issues which we are trying to grasp.
GM: So, we have to ﬁnd a new way of working out how we can get over
being marooned!
UB: Yes, and to do that we need to ﬁnd some diﬀerent ways of thinking
and doing.
GM: If we can reverse from the future back to the past, I would be
interested in your views about the various stories regarding the
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emergence of risk historically and your reﬂections on the way in which
risk developed and evolved distinctly across diﬀerent cultures.
UB: Well, there are diﬀerent opinions on this, but I would say that risk is
a modern concept. Some people say there has always been risk, but
I don’t think this is the correct way of understanding matters. Risk
runs contrary to religious interpretations of the world because it puts
the decisions of humans at the centre and not gods, faith or nature. So,
risk emerges as a way of comprehending and coping with the decisions
and actions of people. Of course, all of this becomes more complex and
develops through the centuries and it’s very much connected to insurance
and all kinds of mathematical forms of quantiﬁcation and categorization.
I actually once tried to construct a parallel history of the development of
the European novel and the development of risk as a concept.
GM: Wow!
UB: There was a very interesting book about the art of novels written by
Milan Kundera. I read this and I was quite fascinated by it. I quoted him
inWorld at Risk. People didn’t like this part of my book but I think that,
regardless, it is intriguing, because you can see how the novel, or the
development of the novel, is a way of telling the narrative of uncertainty,
of adventure, of the paradoxes which come up. I found it fascinating to
look at those parallels in detail. What caught my attention in Kundera’s
book was when he states ‘Der mensch macht fehler’ – man fails – ‘und gott
lacht nicht, aber er la¨chelt’ – and God doesn’t laugh, but he smiles. I think
this is quite an interesting situation because it is the story of losing cer-
tainty: the story of losing yourself in the jungle of modernity, trying to
ﬁnd your way in this jungle, inventing institutional ways of making this
possible, but thereby creating new kinds of problems for which you don’t
have any answers.
This is very much related to the history of rationality and rationaliza-
tion, although it is a diﬀerent story to risk. Maybe not at the beginning –
at the beginning they overlap those two stories, risk is actually a form of
rationality which gives us the capacity to cope with uncertainty and the
problems we are creating. This is actually like Tony (Giddens) says. It is a
way of colonizing the future. But the narrative of risk separates from the
narrative of rationality and actually comes to oppose it. The more we try
to rationalize the world through the paradigm of risk, the more we see
that rationalization doesn’t work. This is actually where the risk society
comes in.
Risk society was not from the outset about trying to manage and cope
with all kinds of risks. Yes, there has been some misinterpretation of the
concept of risk society from the beginning and this persists today. This is
why terms and the translation of terms is so important, because we are in
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a position where we need to create and use new terms. But we are using
old words, combining them somehow and then creating all kinds of
misunderstandings. So this is a major methodological problem, to
create terms which minimize the risk of understanding in a transnational,
cosmopolitanized world. This is the way I would start to talk about
historical diﬀerences. We are now in a situation where we are confronted
by the anticipation of catastrophe. We cannot depend on past or present
experience anymore. We live under conditions of uncertainty and not-
knowing and in which we are threatened by catastrophe. This is the
situation. So, what are we supposed to do?
There are two mistakes that we can make. One scenario would be that
we act as if the unlimited possibilities of catastrophe that confront us are
still ‘normal’ risks. In eﬀect we redeﬁne global risks as normal risks. But
then lots of bad things could happen and institutions are then accused of
not being responsible. In the other scenario, we overdramatize the situ-
ation and say: ‘well, everything is getting very, very bad’. It’s interesting
to think about those two scenarios. In diﬀerent situations people con-
struct diﬀerent scenarios, and there is a learning process in this for
people. For diﬀerent actors those scenarios look diﬀerent. For example,
politicians. If they underestimate the threat they can easily lose public
trust and with it the next election. If they overestimate the risk, they can
still present themselves as saviours of the population.
GM: Like Tony Blair, perhaps.
UB: Yes. So I think maybe for them it’s easier to overestimate the risk,
but there are diﬀerent actors who act diﬀerently in diﬀerent situations in
responding to these risk dilemmas.
GM: Just to interject, did you follow Tony Blair’s testimony to the
Chilcot Inquiry about the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq?
UB: No.
GM: I found it quite gripping in terms of the language of risk he deployed.
Blair actually borrowed your phraseology and talked about ‘a new calcu-
lus of risk’. Of course, you talked about this way back in 1992 inEcological
Politics in an Age of Risk. So, Blair’s testimony explicitly appropriates the
language of catastrophe. He is basically arguing that after 9/11 the tools
and techniques of the past become obsolete. You have to use new tools and
techniques of risk assessment. They weren’t, of course, new tools and
techniques, and they proved to be counterproductive.
UB: Yes, this is true. Politicians are getting the point that the old lan-
guage doesn’t work anymore, but then they are then carrying on as per
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normal and just repeating the same mistakes. In some instances, polit-
icians are confusing the old and the new language and this too is
problematic.
GM: I guess Donald Rumsfeld is the classic example. In actual fact what
he said about the ‘unknown unknowns’ is quite perceptive, in my view.
Nevertheless, he and the Bush administration still carried on regardless,
implementing the old crude techniques and methods of military
intervention.
UB: This would make for a very interesting case study.
GM: Indeed. Going back to the history – or histories – of risk, obviously
there is the narrative of insurance which is important and also a narrative
which is connected to rationality. Secularization is important too, cer-
tainly in terms of the gradual dissolution of the idea of a chain of being.
When the world is understood in relation to a chain of being there is no
need for risk because things will happen, because they have to happen,
because he or she who is ‘up there’ decides. All of these aspects constitute
elements of the story of risk, but the thing I would like to learn more
about concerns temporality. To what extent do shifting notions and
understandings of time and futurity in Giddens’s terms change thinking
about risk?
UB: Yes, this is part of another project I have been involved in with
Daniel Levy. We traced the diﬀerent stages of risk in relation to time.
You could look at all of the key stages drawing across diﬀerent litera-
tures, but the main point is that now, under the conditions of global risk
in a cosmopolitan world, we have to live with a new kind of unknow-
ability. It’s not the kind which existed before. It is pluralized, fragmented
and to some extent individualized as well. In relation to understandings
of time, there is no way of projecting. While modernity has historically
been very much about managing the present and anticipating the future,
this model breaks down.
GM: Yes, I think that is deﬁnitely true, but I think simultaneously insti-
tutions and people are still inured to traditional ways of operating and
still seek to deploy the same modes and means of disciplining and con-
trolling the future.
UB: Yet we have more knowledge about some risks than ever before.
Climate change has been scientiﬁcally diagnosed. This is one case where
we do have very robust knowledge. The same is true to some extent with
radiation. It’s not that we don’t know anything. On the contrary, we
know lots of things. We can predict what might occur if an accident
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happens and what the consequences will be for future generations. So,
there is a complicated relationship between the very detailed knowledge
that we have and the denial that such events will ever transpire.
GM: How do you see this relationship being played out in everyday life
across diﬀerent continents? From the studies that you are involved in
that are ongoing now, what are the key diﬀerences across space and
place? Do you feel that you will ultimately be able to model what has
happened and what is happening in other continents and contrast this
with Western capitalist societies?
UB: First of all, I’ll tell you about an eye-opening experience for me. I think
it was in the early 1990s after Risk Society came out. There was a big
conference on subjects such as this and during proceedings a colleague
stood up and said: ‘Well, Risk Society is beautifully written and very inter-
esting, but I detect a strong scent of German security concerns in the book.’
A few weeks later mad cow disease broke out in Britain! But, nevertheless,
contextual backgrounds are important for what counts as a risk, for what
people understand as a risk. For example, climate change doesn’t have the
same meaning internationally. In some countries they are more concerned
with smaller but more nationally-grounded catastrophes. One example of
this – which we shouldn’t underestimate – is the food safety problem in
China. This is a prescient case in terms of what we have been talking about
as they are still trying to handle it in the conventional way and failing. This
is such a big problem that many of the rich people are leaving China.
Or they are creating their own farms so that they can produce safe food.
So here you can see how even some smaller risks can create a level of
distrust in institutions which is of high political importance.
GM: Yes, so much of this has remained uncovered. The issue of cultural
diﬀerence is something that I certainly need to learn a lot more about.
After visiting Japan it struck me that this is a country where the process
of individualization is so diﬀerent from, say, Germany or the UK. There
is a strong emphasis on structures such as work and the family, but at the
same time you can also see individualized hyper-freedoms, particularly
amongst young people.
UB: From what I understand, if you are studying Japan you have to
connect together the state, the family and the company in a speciﬁc way
because lots of social security has traditionally been produced by the
company and the family and not so much by the state. Yet globalization
undermines the company and families are being disrupted by the neces-
sity of working mobility and so on. So actually there is a new form of
what I would call anomic individualization going on and there are many
symptoms of this. Individualization is deﬁnitely not the same in Japan as
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it is in the Western countries, especially Germany. This is related to some
extent to emancipation because there is security of the state and to some
extent a welfare system. But fear of failure is a big problem. If you don’t
have a job, or you don’t have a good job, you can be seen as a failure to
the family. This can lead to social isolation.
GM: Hence the hikikomori.
UB: Quite. One of the issues here, at least in my perception, is institu-
tionalized individualization. They don’t have institutionalized individu-
alization. Instead, they have free markets and a paradoxical relationship
between a state that wants to have control and at the same time loses
control because of individualization which is necessary for the market
economy to function. Did you know there is a discussion about individu-
alization in the younger generations? I’m actually going to write a chap-
ter about what I am calling ‘generational metamorphosis’. This may be
one of the most important chapters of the book. Young people are very
much aﬀected by metamorphosis. If you think about things from the
point of view of global risk, things can look very pessimistic. We
cannot do anything. But if you start thinking about global risk from
the point of view of catastrophes being emancipatory, the world begins
to look very diﬀerent.
GM: One of the things I’ve tried to grapple with is applying the precau-
tionary principle in relation to risk, particularly in terms of policies of
pre-emption or precaution which may then produce negative eﬀects.
I don’t know if you have any thoughts about this. Is it the case that
we just have to look at each case of potential future harm and then
respond diﬀerently according to what we know about it? How do we
deal with the ‘radical indeterminacy’, in your words?
UB: I’m not too sure if I am ready to answer those questions! But my ﬁrst
reaction would be that the precautionary principle cannot be applied
because there is no way back. We are living in a situation of global
risk. We can’t go back. With climate change we are beyond prevention
and, of course, we have to look at how we handle this situation of uncer-
tainty and not knowing and knowing all at the same time. As we said
before, the precautionary principle doesn’t provide us with an adequate
answer to some future events which we have to take care of. If I was to
retranslate or reinterpret the precautionary principle I would say that we
need to reform the relations of deﬁnition. We need to think about how to
overcome organized responsibility within institutions and also ﬁgure out
who has to prove what and who is responsible to whom and who has to
pay, and these questions have to be part of the thinking in science. How
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can we still use causality, and the norms of causality, to cope with this?
Who has to take responsibility?
When we talk about climate change and try to construct the risk – the
global risk – then we are using maps of CO2 exposure designed to align
with national categories. But national categories amalgamate all kinds of
data that incorporate very diﬀerent levels of exposure which aﬀect dif-
ferent actors and to some extent reproduce the problem of organized
responsibility. It would be worthwhile conducting a mapping exercise,
but a diﬀerent one which is more related to the principal actors who are
producing pollution and identiﬁes speciﬁc industries. Constructing
‘acceptable levels of exposure’ is already part of redoubling organized
responsibility and making it invisible. It’s part of the politics of invisibil-
ity. This would be my argument. This would be one of the new political
consequences which arise, in my view. The issue of visibility is critical in
that it creates obligations and accountability and distribution of costs
and so on. It’s a very important issue. The amazing thing is that the
climate scientists – many of whom who have quite sophisticated under-
standings of the problem actually – are still sticking to the principles of
methodological nationalism.
GM: Yes, so the very techniques of risk assessment that they are using
actually obfuscate the problem. They basically end up shrouding what
they are supposed to be revealing. The undulations in terms of risk dis-
tribution get ﬂattened.
UB: Exactly. So they are actually involved on the one hand in the politics
of visibility, but on the other hand they are part of the politics of invisi-
bility. This contradiction is illuminating. If you look at these things
through the lens of metamorphosis, you see that the whole context
within which the relations of deﬁnition are situated is very important
for questions of how to cope with these kinds of global risk.
GM: So, returning to the metaphor of the double helix, would you say
that people are actually able to recognize that the problem of climate
change is diﬀerent, more severe and more catastrophic, but they remain
locked into the old methods and techniques? Would you say that most
people have made half the journey, rather than the full journey?
UB: Exactly, this is what I would say, yes. The interesting political impli-
cation of this diagnosis would involve trying to demonstrate that there
are diﬀerent strategies and diﬀerent starting points.
GM: I mean you could argue that some experts that have travelled some
of the way – they have almost recognized the magnitude of the problems
of world risk society – are still using the solutions of the ﬁrst modernity.
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These are maybe the ones, the very people actually, that need to be per-
suaded to take the next step. They need to also recognize the limits to their
analysis, because in many respects their analysis simply follows on from
what existed before. So, there would then be a temptation to say: ‘okay, we
know this now, isn’t it great that we have worked it out’, but actually they
are still operating within restricted national limits and boundaries.
GM: It feels as though we have answered none of the questions we have
raised!
UB: That’s ﬁne. I think it’s opening up. It’s all about adopting a diﬀerent
way of looking at things. We don’t need to ﬁnd all of the answers!
GM: No, no it’s really nice. We have had a much more organic discussion
than I had imagined.
UB: I have to say that this conversation has made me go through a lot of
the issues in a new way. It is very encouraging, very motivating.
GM: Can I ask you, I’ve always wanted to ask you this: when you were
writing Risk Society and you completed it, did you have any sense of just
how big it was going to be?
UB: I have to say, from the outset, and when I ﬁnished writing it, yes.
Because I concentrated all of my abilities on making this book possible.
In the book I didn’t tell the story of myself and my background in phil-
osophy. I became a thinker through engagement with Fichte. That made
me, that created the thinker in me. Therefore, I very much knew what I
had done. It was not just by chance that I wrote this book. It was the
same situation that I’m still feeling. I still feel that there are lots of sets of
counter-evidence in the world out there which run against dominant
perceptions and institutionalized ways of thinking and doing social sci-
ences. I knew from my background that I had to write something which
was convincing and that I had to do it in such a way as to create a new
picture. I had travelled beyond philosophy. I felt that philosophy wasn’t
really able to solve the problems we are confronted with. On the one
hand I was grappling with these big philosophical ideas. We had won-
derful discussions in small groups. But on the other hand I recognized
these discussions didn’t relate to the problems I had in mind. So, I didn’t
want to go into universalistic theory construction. As I ﬁnished the book,
I thought this is a big step. I had lots of conversations with people about
the chapters of the book and they reacted diﬀerently.
After Risk Society was published there were two reactions. First of
all, in the normal academic context in Bamberg at the time, I didn’t feel
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comfortable any more. To some extent, I thought that all of those
normal people were looking at things in the normal way. So, I was a
little bit reserved in terms of presenting my own ideas in the reality of
conferences and these kinds of things. Second, there wasn’t a big reac-
tion to my ideas in the beginning. It took months to get a real reaction.
For colleagues there was very little discussion. They felt that the book
wasn’t presented academically. They had problems relating to it, even
after Chernobyl happened. So I thought the moment had somehow
passed by. But then, I think it was at the beginning of January, Der
Spiegel took it up. There was a really big essay about the book in Der
Spiegel. Then things exploded! So, I was a little bit nervous in academia
actually. I thought maybe I had done something wrong, something
dirty perhaps!
GM: You were considered a nestbeschmutzer?
UB: Well, I didn’t know that the book would have such an eﬀect. But I
did expect something to happen. It took quite a while to be translated
into English and again this was a disappointment. It took six years, lots
of time. I thought that things were lost. You know that Tony (Giddens)
picked up the argument very early on, but he didn’t push the translation.
Scott Lash did. I met him when he was in Germany. We met and he
asked Sage if they would want to translate it into English and it hap-
pened. But it took six years, so you do actually think after a year, two
years or three years, maybe it’s not going to happen.
GM: Well, I suppose what did happen in the UK during that time just
added to the resonance of your argument in terms of the BSE crisis and
so on. There were huge debates, conﬂicts, questions of trust, so in a sense
maybe nothing was lost by the delay.
UB: No.
GM: The book became more, not less relevant.
UB: Yes. It did. Okay. I think it is time to go!
Note
This discussion above took place in Munich in August 2014. The author would
like to thank Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim for her kind permission in agreeing to
make this interview public. Thanks are also due to Albert Gro¨ber for his assist-
ance and valuable comments in preparing the final version.
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